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Abstract
Using endogenous, age-dependent measures of the value of statistical lives (VSL),
this paper examines the demographic implications of recessions driven by disease
contagions. Depending on the age-distribution mortality profile of the disease, long-
run welfare losses resulting from the recession may outweigh lost VSL’s directly at-
tributable to the disease. This is because disease contagions that induce high levels
of hospitalization simultaneously impact aggregate output, via a recession caused by
social-distancing, and the productivity of health care services. The efficiency of health
investment falls driving down life expectancy (LE). VSL’s fall both because LE’s fall
and themarginal value of health care investment falls. Using the Hall and Jones (2007)
model of age-specific, endogenous health investment, it is shown that the COVID-19
crisis of 2020 will lead to lost welfare for young agents that exceeds VSL’s lost from
the disease. If COVID-19 had the same age-mortality profile as the 1918 Spanish Flu,
where more young agents died, contagion-mitigation policies that cause deep reces-
sions would still be socially optimal since more of the high-valued lives of young
people would be saved.
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1 Introduction
In the United States (U.S.), the initial spring 2020 policy response to the spread of the
COVID-19 disease contagion was largely driven by public health experts concerned both
with mitigating the impact of an infection surge on the health care system and reducing
the total number of deaths. To accomplish this states and municipalities imposed poli-
cies to limit social contact. These policies forced certain businesses to close and led to
reductions in economic output. While these sacrifices were sold as necessary to contain
the spread of the disease and preserve lives, the distributional effects of such policies on
different consumers of different ages were left largely ignored.
In this paper it is argued that the economic impacts of the 2020 recession will be felt
unequally across the age distribution and may outweigh the welfare loss directly at-
tributable to disease deaths. Through the lens of the overlapping-generations, health-
production model of Hall and Jones (2007), it is shown that the welfare outcomes of
younger consumers, especially children, are more sensitive to an aggregate economic
shock. The model endogenously generates measures both of life expectancy (LE) and
the consumption value of a statistical life (VSL) that depend on age, income, and the effi-
ciency of the health care system. When aggregated over the population distribution, it is
shown that reductions both in LE and VSL due to recessions that accompany disease con-
tagions may exceed the welfare loss directly attributable to the disease. Further, young
agents, as a generation, bear the brunt of this excess burden as long as the age-mortality
profile of the disease is skewed older.
Because mortality rates for COVID-19, for example, are skewed toward older adults,
diseasemitigationmandates that induce an economic contraction are socially sub-optimal
as long as total disease deaths remain below 750,000 in the U.S. for the year 2020. In
a counterfactual experiment, an alternative disease-mortality distribution is considered,
specifically one that resembles the 1918 Spanish Flu which primarily impacted teenagers
and young adults. With such a disease, sacrificing income for policies designed to mit-
igate contagion spread and save lives is more likely to improve aggregate welfare since
the high-value lives of young consumers are being saved. Meanwhile with COVID-19,
policymakers have fewer paths to aggregate welfare improvement, where some policies
that restrict economic output just shift the burden of the crisis from old to young.
The main mechanism of the model works as follows. An aggregate shock simultane-
ously affects income and the efficiency of health investments. Optimal health care invest-
ments and other consumption fall as income falls. With age-specific health investment
elasticities, it is estimated that younger consumers experience greater long-run welfare
1
loss to reduced health investment than older consumers despite being relatively unaf-
fected in the short run. This long-run impact reduces their age-specific VSL, which is the
primary measure of welfare considered here.
The macroeconomic data justify examination of such a mechanism. The 2020 reces-
sion is the first recession since the 1960-1961 recession during which aggregate personal
health care services expenditure has declined, falling 3.85% in the first quarter of 2020
from the fourth quarter of 2019.1 Amidst the current crisis, many hospitals and medical
offices effectively shut down for months, foregoing procedures for all but the most imme-
diate of emergencies in order to devote system capacity to disease patients. Consumers
have had no choice but to delay or even cancel medical procedures and doctor visits,
all while still paying health insurance premiums. As local shutdowns are reversed and
these restrictions are relaxed, medical professionals have been forced to deal with a back
log of patients which could exacerbate difficulties getting appointments for non-critical
procedures. In such an environment, the risk of certain diseases, like cancer, diabetes,
and cardiovascular diseases, going undiagnosed increases. Thus, the restrictions on med-
ical procedures amount to a health-care productivity shock, impacting the efficiency of
health investment and health outcomes. This paper examines the potential consequences
of these shutdowns across the age distribution through the lens of a model in which con-
sumers respond to aggregate income and health productivity shocks by endogenously
adjusting their health care investment. This affects year-on-year survival rates, LE’s, and
VSL’s.
Finally, non-health-technology factors unique to the current recession could also be
adversely affecting health outcomes, especially for children. Inmany regions, kids forewent
in-person instruction for much of the spring-2020 school semester and thus have had
reduced social contact with influential adults. While for many children this may not
be problematic, children with learning disabilities and other behavioral issues are more
likely to be adversely affected. A review of the literature reveals that increased behavioral
issues in children are often associated with adverse health outcomes, which will be dis-
cussed in more detail below. Thus, there is reason to believe that residual forces unique
to the current recession may also be affecting long-run health outcomes independent of
the apparent shock to the efficiency of health services.
This paper thus confronts some of the primary challenges presented by the COVID-
1See the National Income and Product Accounts Table 2.8.5. from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis,
accessed on July 1, 2020. In addition to the decline in health spending, the 2020 recession associated with
the COVID-19 crisis is shaping up to be primarily driven by a decline in consumption: aggregate personal
consumption expenditure fell 6.6% month-on-month in March of 2020 followed by an additional 12.6% in
April before rebounding 8.2% in May.
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19 crisis, with a specific focus on the intergenerational impacts of lost economic output
and death from disease contagion. It is thus recognized that policymakers may face the
dilemma of enacting policies that reduce short-run deaths but also decrease aggregate
output and health-care efficiency which each have long-run, negative impacts on wel-
fare. Depending on the severity of the recession and how deadly the disease is, under
many policies the damage to long-run welfare may exceed the short-run benefits. Life ex-
pectancy and the consumption value of life for the young are particularly harmed by the
indirect economic factors associated with the current recession. Meanwhile, older adults
are more at risk from dying from the disease. In order for the consumption value of lost
life years associated with COVID-19 to exceed the value of lost years associated with in-
direct factors resulting from a policy-driven recession, the recession needs to be relatively
mild and the number of deaths prevented relatively high. Otherwise, a greater share of
the burden is placed on the shoulders of the young.
This paper will proceed as follows. Section 2 will present evidence from the literature
arguing why using a welfare measure that depends on health investment is important
to understand the distributional implications of the 2020 COVID-19 crisis. Section 3 pro-
vides a brief overview of the Hall and Jones (2007) model. Section 4 describes the data
used for parameter selection and important outcomes of the estimation. Section 5 simu-
lates various recession and COVID-19 death scenarios to analyze the welfare implications
of the 2020 crisis through the model’s lens. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Background
2.1 Welfare Implications of COVID-19
Many economists have considered thewelfare implications of COVID-19. In amodel with
no consumer heterogeneity, Eichenbaum, Rebelo, and Trabandt (2020) show that contain-
ing the spread of the contagion may be welfare-improving in spite of the severe recession
such policies cause. By contrast Bethune and Korinek (2020) show that a more nuanced
approach, where infected agents are fully isolated, is socially optimal and yields milder
recessions compared to full shutdowns. Bethune and Korinek (2020) acknowledge that
in the event such a nuanced approach is infeasible aggressive containment is still opti-
mal though very costly. Glover et al. (2020) advocate for a partial, possibly Swedish-style
containment policy. Their approach, like the one in this paper, considers the effects of
shutdowns on different age groups, and they find that elderly consumers benefit far more
than the young from stringent containment policies that vastly reduce economic activity.
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Meanwhile, Correia, Luck, and Verner (2020) attempt to use variation between U.S. cities’
economic shutdown policies during the 1918 Spanish Flu pandemic to argue that short-
term shutdowns to mitigate disease contagion improve long-run growth. Barro, Ursúa,
and Weng (2020) have similar findings. Both results hinge on the fact that working-age
adults were most likely to die from the 1918 Spanish Flu, which is not true in the case of
COVID-19. But, as is shown here, accounting for differences in the age-mortality distri-
bution matters for optimal-mitigation policies.
The primary contribution of this paper is to consider aggregate welfare implications
in a framework with both endogenous LE’s and VSL’s that are also heterogeneous across
ages and depend on health investment. Results and conclusions presented here conform
more with results in Bethune and Korinek (2020), Glover et al. (2020), and Krueger, Uhlig,
and Xie (2020), suggesting a nuanced response to COVID-19 that does not too drastically
limit commercial activity. Such policies can be aggregate-welfare improving as long as
they reduce overall COVID-19 deaths sufficiently, depending on the various modeling
assumptions.
2.2 The Impact of Recessions and Poverty on Childhood Development
Since this paper argues that the welfare impacts of the COVID-19 recession are dispropor-
tionately shouldered by young people, it is important to understand why policymakers
and economists should care about this by reviewing the literature on recessions, poverty,
and childhood development. Generally speaking, if the 2020 COVID-19 economic reces-
sion leads to increases in poverty andmalnourishment amongst children and decreases in
stimulating contact with adults, like educators and mentors, adverse impacts to long-run
welfare should be expected.
Heckman, Pinto, and Savelyev (2013) establish the long-run, positive impacts of in-
teractive early childhood development programs on the life outcomes of an individual
participant. Heckman (2008) discusses how ability gaps between advantaged and dis-
advantaged children start early in life and can be mitigated by substantial, targeted in-
vestment in early childhood programs. Early environmental factors due to parenting
and familial practices can also lead to better developmental outcomes (Heckman 2008).
But financially-stressed families are less likely to have time for full parental engagement,
which could negatively affect future outcomes for school-aged children of working par-
ents who are out of school due to COVID-19 shutdowns.
Campbell et al. (2014) find that stimulating early childhood development leads to sig-
nificantly better health and cognitive outcomes during adulthood. In their study, children
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subjected to a treatment where they were engaged in “social stimulation interspersed
with caregiving and supervised play throughout a full 8-hour day for the first 5 years” of
their lives where theywere also given “twomeals and a snack at the childcare center [and]
were offered primary pediatric care” had significantly lower risk for non-communicable
diseases in their mid-30s (Campbell et al. 2014). Hoddinott et al. (2011) provide strong
evidence that sustained investments in early-life nutrition and childhood development
lead to welfare improvements over the life cycle and thus the long run. If the current
shutdown not only leads to less stimulating social contact but also limits the ability of
impoverished children to benefit from free school breakfast and lunch programs, school
closures will have adverse impacts that affect social, intellectual, and physical develop-
ment.
The evidence on child health outcomes resulting from economic contractions versus
expansions is mixed. Ferreira and Schady (2009) review empirical evidence finding that
in rich countries, like the U.S., recessions may not have an adverse impact on the health
and human capital development of children. Indeed, they find that child health and ed-
ucational outcomes appear counter-cyclical. The counter-cyclical nature of educational
outcomes for children may be due to the outsize, positive effect of the Great Depression
on high school graduation rates (Goldin 1999; Black and Sokoloff 2006). Recent microe-
conomic evidence in the U.S. also suggests that infant mortality may be counter-cyclical
(Chay and Greenstone 2003; Dehejia and Lleras-Muney 2004; Ferreira and Schady 2009).
But, while infant mortality may be countercyclical, there is evidence that out-of-pocket
spending on childhood health care services is pro-cyclical, especially for children with
a high baseline level of medical care (Karaca-Mandic, Choi Yoo, and Sommers 2013).
Such children often have special needs and are more sensitive to pullbacks in medical
care spending. Further evidence from developing countries suggests that on the whole,
children’s health outcomes are made worse by recession, with potential long-run con-
sequences resulting from malnutrition and stunted growth (Jensen 2000; Stillman and
Thomas 2004; Paxson and Schady 2005; Alderman, Hoddinott, and Kinsey 2006; Ferreira
and Schady 2009).
Other microeconomic studies focussing on parents’ labor market outcomes suggest
that economic downturns likely harm childhood development more than they open up
opportunities for developmental improvement. Kalil (2013) reviews the preponderance
of evidence as to how parental job loss and income instability affect childhood develop-
ment, concluding that the Great Recession likely adversely affected children’s long-run
economic outcomes. For example, parental job loss, especially in families with lower so-
cioeconomic status, is associated both with negative effects on educational outcomes and
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behavioral and emotional health problems for children during their teenage years (Ore-
opoulos, Page, and Stevens 2008; Ananat et al. 2011; Kalil 2013). Further, the adverse
impacts on emotional and psychological health of children experiencing parental job loss
appear to persist for at least five years (Kind and Haisken-DeNew 2012). Many studies
suggest that mere perceptions of parents’ job insecurity are enough to cause stress that
leads to poor educational outcomes and behavioral problems (Barling, Dupre, and Hep-
burn 1998; Barling, Zacharatos, and Hepburn 1999; Conger and Donnellan 2007; Ananat
et al. 2011; Schneider, Waldfogel, and Brooks-Gunn 2015). This is because fear and anx-
iety can tax cognitive skills, adversely affecting behavioral health (Leininger and Kalil
2012; Shah, Mullainathan, and Shafir 2012). Given the high unemployment numbers seen
during the 2020 economic crisis, we should expect that familial stresses induced by job
insecurities are at play, possibly affecting children’s health outcomes.
Poverty in general, whether wrought from aggregate shocks or just bad luck, induces
stress and results in adverse child-development outcomes (Boyer and Halbrook 2011).
Childhood stress can manifest itself as poor physical health outcomes during teenage
years (Evans and Schamberg 2009). It can also stunt brain development and limit the
ability of the individual to engage in complicated cognitive functions, like deep critical
thinking, in the future (Sapolsky 2004). Disparities in academic outcomes in early school-
ing years brought on by a lack of initial human capital development may be magnified as
children progress through school (Cunha et al. 2006). In conclusion, childhood poverty is
associated with poor outcomes during adulthood, including a higher propensity for crim-
inal behavior, mental illness, and general health disparities (Evans and Kim 2007; Evans
and Schamberg 2009; Nikulina, Widom, and Czaja 2011; Kim et al. 2013).
Thinking about the dynamic, long-run impacts of economic shocks to individuals
across the age distribution, especially with respect to health outcomes, will help build
inference as to which policies can dampen and mitigate recessions’ adverse effects on
children. In light of evidence that directly links the health and viability of adults to their
early childhood education (Campbell et al. 2014), policies that reduce negative impacts of
recessions on childhood cognition should be considered.
2.3 Measuring the Value of Statistical Lives
In this paper, the primary exercise is to analyze a dynamic model that generates en-
dogenous measures of LE and VSL as a result of the consumption and health invest-
ment choices of age-heterogeneous agents. While the model will generate a measure of
VSL that relies on howmarginal changes to health investment improve age-specific, non-
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accidental mortality rates, in the literature such a measure of VSL is rather uncommon.
To the best knowledge of this author, the only other paper that attempts to estimate VSL’s
using both mortality rates and age-specific health spending is Hall and Jones (2007), from
which the model here is borrowed directly with a few slight modifications.
In the empirical literature, VSL’s are typically estimated using labor market outcomes.
Specifically, one can regress the between-industrywage premium on differentials in industry-
specific accidental mortality rates, while controlling for skills and human capital. In the
VSL literature, this is known as the “revealed preference” approach. Other approaches,
known as “stated preference” approaches, explicitly ask individuals howmuch theywould
be willing to accept in exchange for increased risk of death. Viscusi and Aldy (2003) and
Kniesner and Viscusi (2019) provide a review of both of these strands of the VSL litera-
ture, suggesting that for working-age men, VSL’s are $10 million in 2018 dollars. That
is consumption value of an average working-age male’s life is around $10 million. But,
some authors have criticized estimates from labormarket measures as quantitatively frag-
ile, since skills and human capital are difficult to observe (Siebert and Wei 1994; Leigh
1995; Miller 2000; Hintermann, Alberini, and Markandya 2010). Nordhaus (2002) criti-
cizes measures of VSL from the labor market literature because they fail to account for
possible dynamic changes to both future risk and future income, as such estimates only
reflect a current risk to current income tradeoff. This is problematic considering that mor-
tality premia have risen along with the health services share of consumption (Nordhaus
2002, 2005). Such a criticism thus provides impetus for alternative models which generate
VSL’s using health spending and mortality outcomes, as is done in this paper.
Further, using labor market outcomes to quantify VSL’s can be limiting since not all
age groups actually work. Specifically, VSL’s for children and elderly retirees are ignored
in such studies. This may be problematic since Aldy and Viscusi (2008) find significant
correlations between VSL and age for workers in different age groups. They conclude
that VSL follows an inverted-U-shaped profile, where younger workers in their late teens
and early twenties and older workers nearing retirement have similar VSL’s of around $5
million in 2018 dollars, while prime-age workers have VSL’s over $13 million. But how
can we measure the VSL for, say, a 10-year old when using only labor market outcomes?
To estimate youth VSL’s, some studies rely on parents’ willingness to pay (WTP) to re-
duce childhood risks of death or trauma. Byl (2013) uses evidence from the infant car-seat
market to show that children’s lives are valued at a premium to adults’. This premium
is almost double and could be as high as $17 million in inflation-adjusted 2018 dollars.
Jenkins, Owens, and Wiggins (2001), using the market for bicycle helmets, estimate sep-
arate VSL’s for children and adults, finding the opposite of Byl (2013): adults’ lives are
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typically more valuable. Other authors have used stated-preference surveys to ask adults
how much they would pay to reduce the risk by half of a child being killed by a parent
or caregiver (Corso, Fang, and Mercy 2011; Peterson, Florence, and Klevens 2018). Such
surveys conclude that the level of VSL for children is around $17 million in 2018 dollars.
Hammitt and Haninger (2010) also find significantly higher VSL’s for children using a
stated-preference survey involving willingness to pay to reduce risk from fatal diseases
and traumas — around $16 million for children versus $7-12 million for their parents.
While there seems to be a consensus in the literature as to the range of plausible VSL’s
for adults, there is debate as to the shape of the life-cycle VSL profile when younger age
groups are included. The findings presented in this paper, as well as those in Hall and
Jones (2007), suggest that VSL’s are likely declining, almost monotonically, in age. The
results here thus confirm many of the aforementioned WTP studies, while contrasting
with the age-profile VSL estimates of Aldy and Viscusi (2008).
This paper takes the health production approach to measuring age-specific VSL’s. It
is thus assumed that increases in health investment lead to decreases in non-accidental
mortality and thus increases in life expectancy. VSL’s are then identified parametrically
by the marginal cost, in consumption units, of decreasing the non-accidental mortality
rate. The approach presented here thus relies on a revealed preference argument: the
investments made in children’s health care by society as a whole reflect how much value
society places on children’s lives. Indeed, as will be shown, children enjoy a large VSL
premium over their parents when using health investment data.
3 Model
Inmodeling how a sudden and unexpected disease contagion simultaneously affects both
economic and health outcomes, we turn to the centralized endowment economy in Hall
and Jones (2007). In their dynamic model, health investment by consumers positively
affects health status through a health production function that is both age- and time-
dependent. Increases in health status lead to declines in mortality risk, raising the proba-
bility the age-a consumer in period twill live to be an age-a+ 1 consumer in period t+ 1.
Consumers thus face a tradeoff in choosing consumption cat, which yields flow utility to-
day, versus health investment hat, which increases the probability of future survival and
thus the value of future consumption flow utilities. In this manner, health status and thus
survival probabilities are endogenous.
The model here departs from Hall and Jones (2007) by assuming the period-length is
one year instead of five. Consumers live up to age 100, so in any given period there are
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101 cohorts of consumers alive, counting newborns. Each age-a cohort in period t is char-
acterized by a representative agent, so that there is no heterogeneity within age groups,
only across age groups and over time. In any given period, there are Nat consumers of age
a alive. Every consumer is assumed to contribute the same amount yt to net resources,
so that yt can be thought of as income per-capita. From this assumption, all variation in
contributions to aggregate welfare across age groups and over time is strictly dependent
on variation of per-capita health investments by age.
Using endogenous health investment, the model generates measures of VSL by age
from the marginal cost of health production. This permits analysis as to how different co-
horts are disparately impacted by both aggregate output shocks affecting yt and shocks to
health care technology directly impacting health status. Each of these channels will affect
welfare measures which rely on VSL’s. First, health investment will vary as net resources
change, affecting the marginal cost of health production and thus mortality rates. Sec-
ond, changes in the productivity of health services will directly affect the marginal cost of
health production for any given level of health investment. But, this will also induce con-
sumers to adjust their health investments as long as mortality risk is not perfectly inelastic
with respect to health investment.
Denote health status as xat, which is a function of health care consumption hat, an ag-
gregate health sector productivity component zt, and an idiosyncratic, age-specific com-
ponent wat, so that xat = fa(hat; zt,wat), where fa is increasing in all arguments. hat can
also be thought of as health investment, since its purchase level has dynamic, long-run
implications for survival. wat accounts for factors orthogonal to health technology ad-
vancement, like un-modeled decisions related to education or habits like smoking and
drug use. Hall and Jones (2007) assume zt and hat account for some known fraction µ of
the decline in U.S. mortality rates over the last half century, while wat accounts for the re-
mainder. This leads to an identification issue which is addressed in Section 4.1, re-visiting
some fundamental findings from the health outcomes literature.
Health status, xat, is the inverse of the age-a, period-t mortality rate, mat = 1/xat.
Survival rates are thus 1−mat = 1− 1/xat. Total mortality is the sum of accidental maccat
and non-accidental mnonat mortality. Health care investment decisions hat are assumed to
only affect non-accidental mortality, so that health status can be written
xat = fa(hat; zt,wat) =
1
maccat +m
non
at
=
1
maccat + 1/x˜at
(1)
x˜at(hat) = Aa(zthatwat)
θa (2)
In addition to choosing hat, consumers also choose other consumption cat. They receive
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flow utility from cat according to the iso-elastic function u(cat) =
c1−γat
1−γ .
2
Each consumer receives exogenous endowment income yt which evolves according to
some known process. All risk is thus idiosyncratic and endogenous, acting through the
survival function. Finally, each period assume consumers have base utility bat, which will
be calibrated to ensure that the value of life is zero upon death. As Hall and Jones (2004)
discuss in their working paper, bat will usually be positive since calibrated choices of γ
are > 1, ensuring that u(cat) < 0. There is no savings mechanism and labor is assumed
to be supplied inelastically.
Under these conditions and assuming equal Pareto weights for all agents alive in pe-
riod t, the social-welfare maximizing allocations satisfy
Vt(Nt) = max
{hat ,cat}a
∞
∑
a=0
Nat
[
bat + u(cat)
]
+βVt+1(Nt+1) (3)
subject to
∞
∑
a=0
Nat(yt − cat − hat) = 0 (4)
Na+1,t+1 =
(
1−
1
xat
)
Nat (5)
xat = fa(hat; zt,wat) (6)
yt+1 = e
gytyt (7)
where Nt is a vector with components N1t,N2t, . . . ,Nat, . . . describing the population dis-
tribution in t, and β ∈ (0, 1) describes a consumer’s time preferences.3
Optimal allocations of {hat, cat}a are subject to the equilibrium condition
β va+1,t+1
uc︸         ︷︷         ︸
Marginal Benefit of Saving a Life
=
x2at
f ′(hat)︸    ︷︷    ︸
Marginal Cost of Saving a Life
∀a, t (8)
va+1,t+1 is the standard envelope condition,
∂Vt+1
∂Na+1,t+1
, which captures how the total future
value of social welfare changes in response to variation in the population level of agents
surviving from age a in t to become age a + 1 in t + 1. Under the parameterization of
2Hall and Jones (2007) consider both a flow utility function that only features other consumption and one
where consumers benefit from health status. This so-called “quality of life” utility component is omitted
here, without loss of generality. Indeed, Hall and Jones (2007) show that regardless of whether the quality
of life component is included, VSL estimates are hardly affected.
3The planner’s optimization problem is the same as that in the working paper Hall and Jones (2004),
where base utilities are allowed to be both age- and time-dependent. This specification is preferred to that
in the published version of the paper, so that bat can be directly calibrated to match VSL’s estimated from
health investment technology.
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health technology in (2), the right hand side of (8) is hat x˜at(hat)/θa, which is a measure of
VSL. In practice, the age- and time-varying utility intercepts bat, can be backed out of (8) to
ensure that the empirical estimates of VSL’s, using the marginal cost of health production
on the right, exactly equal the marginal benefit attributable to household preferences.
That is, given data on health outcomes, income, consumption, bat can be calibrated to
force (8) to hold.
4 Parameter Selection
Updating both versions of Hall and Jones (2004, 2007), the health production parameters
are selected using a regression of survival probabilities on health spending that accounts
for possible trends in age-specific residuals, wat. The estimation of x˜at(hat) is described in
detail in Section 4.1, where several assumptions on the fraction of trend decline in mor-
tality associated with technological change, which is denoted by µ, are considered. With
health production parameters, productivities, and residuals in hand, age-specific, period-
t VSL’s can be computed using the marginal cost approach: VSLat = hat x˜at(hat)/θa. Hav-
ing VSL’s, base utilities bat, can be backed out of the equilibrium condition (8) following a
procedure described briefly in Section 4.2. Finally, in Section 4.3, given the health produc-
tion parameters, productivities, and base utilities, the model is solved backwards from
2018 to 1959 by simulating equilibrium choices of cat and hat for yt computed from NIPA.
4.1 Estimating Health Production Parameters
Aggregate NIPA data from 1959-2018 and age-specific health spending data from Meara,
White, and Cutler (2004) are used to estimate Aa and θa for each a. Aggregate health
spending is the sum of personal consumption expenditure (PCE) on health care and gov-
ernment spending on health care. All other non-health-care consumption is the sum of
other PCE spending and non-health-related government spending. To compute these
data points, we can turn to NIPA’s PCE Tables 2.5.3, 2.5.4, and 2.5.5, and the government
outlay Tables 3.15.3, 3.15.4, and 3.15.5. Dealing with unit-uniformity issues arising from
combining chain-weighted price and quantity indices, the procedures in Whelan (2002)
are used to construct new indices for the combined aggregate series using both PCE and
government spending. Using the aggregated health spending data, age-dependent health
spending distributions are constructed by utilizing the weights for five-year age groups
described inMeara, White, and Cutler (2004) and interpolating bothwithin periods across
age groups and over time to arrive at annual distributions of health spending from 1959
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to 2018 for consumers of ages 0 to 100. A cubic polynomial is used for interpolation over
the time dimension. Where extrapolation is required, assume the health spending distri-
bution across ages is stationary after the last year of observations in the sample.4 Within a
period, a simple replication scheme is followed: since health spending data is only avail-
able for individual averages over ten-year age groups, the same health spending level is
assigned to all individuals within an age group. For age-specific mortality data, several
sources for both accidental and non-accidental mortality rates are used — for years 1950
to 2003, the National Center for Health Statistics report, Health, United States, 2003, and
for years 2004 to 2017, the National Vital Statistics Reports, Volume 68, Number 9, Deaths:
Final Data for 2017, updated on June 24, 2019. Finally, life-expectancy data, which are not
directly used in the estimation but matched independent of parameter selection, are taken
from Table 4 of the 2017 National Vital Statistics Reports.
With health investment and mortality data, (2) is estimated separately for each age-a
consumer unit using a two-step regression procedure where the trend in wat is assumed
orthogonal to health outcomes x˜at whenever it is also assumed that some fraction µ of
mortality trend decline is attributable to non-technological factors. Note that when µ = 1
all trend decline in mortality is assumed to be attributed to technological change acting
through either zt or yt via hat. For more details on this identification argument see the
discussion in Hall and Jones (2007).
Here, two separate assumptions on µ are considered and the orthogonality restriction
for the trend in wat is assessed using a C-test on the difference in two Sargan/Hansen
statistics described in detail in Hayashi (2000). In all cases the growth rate in zt is assumed
to be identical to growth in yt, i.e. gz = gy. This assumption is affirmed by empirical work
in Horenstein and Santos (2019) who find little evidence to suggest productivity growth
in the health sector substantially differs from GDP growth. In the first exercise, it is as-
sumed that µ = 1, so that all decline in mortality is due to technical advancement. In the
µ = 1 case, the orthogonality of trend in wat is irrelevant. Alternatively, examining the
case where µ = 2/3 as in Hall and Jones (2007) allows for the orthogonality restriction on
trend growth in wat to be tested. The C-test fails to reject such a restriction, so gwa t is used
as an instrumental variable (IV). This empirical result jibes with the original findings in
Hall and Jones (2007) and other studies which suggest that factors not related to health
spending have played an important role in mortality rate declines (Fogel 2004; Grossman
2005; Cutler, Deaton, and Lleras-Muney 2006). The preferred health production specifica-
4This extrapolation assumption was tested where the extrapolated data using the Meara, White, and
Cutler (2004) age-specific health spending estimates were compared against data from the Centers forMedi-
care & Medicaid Services (CMS 2019). Differences between the age-distributions of health investment are
insignificant. The results of this test are available upon request.
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tion is thus the 2SLS estimation where µ = 2/3 and gwa t is used as an IV.
(a) Health Production Intercept (b) Elasticity w.r.t. Health Investment
Figure 1: Here, plots of the estimates for ln Aa and θa are presented. The cases where
µ = 1 and µ = 2/3 with no trend instrument track each other in terms of the declining
profile by age. The IV versus non-IV regressions yield similar estimates except for the
15-25 age group. All estimates of θa are significant at the 1% level.
Figure 1 presents estimates for the time-independent health production parameters,
where age indexes the horizontal axes. The stair-step feature of the estimates reflects the
interpolation scheme assigning the same health and survival rates to everyone in ten-year
age groups. In the µ = 2/3 case, the introduction of the linear-trend IV only significantly
affects inference as to the elasticity of health outcomes θa for 15-25 year olds, which can
be seen by looking at the differences in the gold versus red lines in Figure 1b.
Focussing on θa, notice that this elasticity appears to consistently decline in age, with
the exception of the jump for teens and young adults. Its negative, −θa, is the elasticity
of the preventable mortality rate with respect to health spending. It thus represents the
percent change of a percentage-point decline in mortality with respect to health spending.
To fix intuition as to why θa mostly declines with age, consider the non-accidental mor-
tality rates of a 30-year old and a 70-year old. Currently, a 30-year old has a probability
of dying before he reaches age 31 of approximately 0.0006, or 0.06%, while a 70-year old
has a probability of dying before reaching age 71 of 0.0175 or 1.75%. Estimates of θ30 and
θ70 for the µ = 2/3 case with no IV are 0.6540 and 0.4012 respectively. A 1% increase in
health spending by a 30-year old thus leads to a 0.65% reduction in the mortality rate, so
that the new mortality percentage is 0.02%, amounting to an absolute reduction of 0.04%.
Meanwhile, for a 70-year old, a 1% increase in health spending leads to mortality declin-
ing from 1.75% to 1.05%, or 0.7% in absolute terms. Thus, despite the fact that θ70 < θ30,
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a 1% increase in health spending for a 70-year old actually has a greater impact on overall
mortality-rate decline because the 70-year old is starting at a base rate that is substantially
lower than that of the 30-year old.
(a) Productivity Levels, 2018 = 1 (b) Productivity Growth Rates
Figure 2: These plots illustrate both the evolution of age-weighted health productivities
(a) and the age-specific growth rates (b). In panel (a) estimates are projected out to 2100
to illustrate the differential rates at which returns to health care investment evolve for
different age groups. In panel (b), estimated health productivity growth rates from 1959
to 2018 show that younger and older adults benefitted the most from residual returns to
health care efficiency zt and other age-specific indirect factors wat over the latter half of
the twentieth century.
Figure 2 shows the age-weighted productivity levels and growth rates over time under
the assumption µ = 2/3. Age-weighted growth is (1/µ − 1) (gha + gz) + gz. Both older
and younger age groups experience faster health productivity growth than working-age
adults. The measure of productivity presented here accounts both for changes in the total
factor productivity of health services zt and changes to the idiosyncratic, age-specific com-
ponent wat, which captures other exogenous factors, unrelated to health services produc-
tivity. These include everything from improvements to public-school lunch and nutrition
programs for children to heightened on-the-job safety standards for adults, as well as the
effects of changes to pollution, urban density, and other environmental forces. wat, espe-
cially for young agents, will capture the aforementioned residual, non-health-technology
impacts of the 2020 recession, such as factors resulting from school closures adversely
affecting young agents’ health outcomes. Multiplied together, ztwat then captures the de-
gree to which returns to health productivity zt are either enhanced or dampened by these
other age-dependent factors.
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4.2 Estimating Base Utilities, bat
To compute bat, an estimate of VSLat is needed so that the health production function
TFP and elasticity estimates can reconcile both cat and hat in a full decision-theoretic equi-
librium environment. The right-hand side of (8) is a measure of VSLat, which can be
computed using only health data and fitted health production parameters. Thus, after
fitting the health production function, with an estimate for VSLat in hand and assuming
that v101,t = 0 for all t, β va+1,t+1 can be backed out and the model’s full Lagrangian
expression can be used to compute
vat = bat + u(ct) +β va+1,t+1 + uc (yt − ct − hat) (9)
where uc is the marginal utility of consumption, and output per-capita, consumption per-
capita, and health investment are data. Note that, given the problem here is that of a
planner efficiently allocating resources, it is without loss of generality that ct = cat since,
by the Second Welfare Theorem, there exist implicit transfers reconciling this efficient
allocation for a de-centralized environment.5 With bat in hand, it remains only to vary γ
and β to solve for equilibrium values of ct and hat generated by the full decision-theoretic
model.
4.3 Equilibrium VSL’s and Life Expectancy
Given γ, β is selected to match consumption growth gc from a classical Euler equation,
so that β = (1 + gc)γ/1.04, where 1.04 is assumed to be the gross interest rate and
gc = 0.0168 — average per-capita consumption growth from 1959-2018. Given bat and
the health production parameters, the model is solved using several values of γ selected
over the interval (1, 2]. γ = 1.25 best matches the life expectancy of newborns and the
aggregate share of health spending in 2018. Figure 3 presents model-generated equilib-
rium LE’s of newborns under different values of γ along with LE estimates from data.
The model’s equilibrium appears to adequately capture the increasing profile over time.
γ = 1.25 is used for the upcoming simulations because the equilibrium time series un-
der this assumption appears to provide the closest match to LE’s from the data in 2018.
Further, lower values of γ are associated with greater leveling-off in long run LE growth,
which is also apparent in the data, especially in the decade after the Great Recession.
In equilibrium, the model generates estimates for working-age adults’ VSL’s in line
with VSL estimates from labor market outcomes. Table 1 presents these estimates for the
5Hall and Jones (2007) also recognize this fact, as evidenced by their calibration scheme.
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Figure 3: This plot presents the life expectancy of newborns from the simulated model
equilibria under different values of γ alongside life-expectancy data taken from the Na-
tional Vital Statistics Reports. In all separate simulations where γ is varied, it is assumed
thatµ = 2/3 and health production function estimates from the 2SLSmodel are used. The
preferred specification has γ = 1.25, which most closely matches life expectancy data in
2018, the last year in the present data sample.
preferred specification where µ = 2/3, γ = 1.25, and health production parameters are
taken from the 2SLS regression with a trend IV. Both cumulative VSL’s and VSL’s divided
by age-specific LE, where the latter is a measure of the value of life per year of life saved,
are presented. 2018 VSL estimates for 30, 40, and 50 year olds in the baseline model range
from $4 to $9 million. Estimates using Mincer-style regressions on wages and industry-
specific mortality risk, which are thoroughly reviewed in Kniesner and Viscusi (2019),
suggest values within this range. Meanwhile, VSL estimates for children are notably
higher and exceed the ranges of estimates frommicroeconomic studies looking at parents’
WTP for child-safety products and reviewed in this paper in Section 2.3.
Notice that, not only do children have higher VSL’s measuring the expected consump-
tion value of their remaining life years (top half of table), but some, particularly 10-year-
olds, also have higher VSL’s per life-year remaining (VSL/LE in the bottom half of the
table). Now consider the fact that there are far more children between the age of say
5 and 15 than elderly people between the age of say 75 and 85. Suppose an arbitrary
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Table 1: Equilibrium VSL’s, γ = 1.25, µ = 2/3 with IV
Value of Life in Thousands of 2018$
Age 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2018
0 2010.966 3330.654 4763.997 6525.515 7996.263 8935.804 9552.773
10 5854.994 8033.472 11068.602 16009.304 21853.497 29520.890 34287.264
20 1889.003 2223.565 2679.445 3655.983 4916.239 6113.957 6841.157
30 2672.409 3614.118 4547.095 6298.397 8388.125 8932.166 8281.171
40 1534.607 2344.928 3161.870 4411.828 5495.411 6220.439 6202.894
50 793.792 1347.851 1890.560 2717.719 3485.834 4009.968 4404.305
60 506.081 914.671 1332.577 1944.938 2556.526 3049.265 3482.870
70 439.982 799.947 1166.095 1714.775 2247.303 2666.708 3100.446
80 452.276 799.654 1124.982 1622.251 2103.413 2426.037 2763.816
90 412.520 716.010 979.319 1383.096 1769.241 2017.137 2194.594
Value of Life per Year of Life Remaining in Thousands of 2018$
Age 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2018
0 28.958 46.452 64.840 86.651 104.302 115.317 122.684
10 97.375 129.009 173.109 243.731 326.261 435.649 503.326
20 37.353 42.167 49.285 65.235 85.832 105.394 117.244
30 64.834 83.254 101.022 135.150 175.666 184.334 169.622
40 47.771 68.404 88.287 118.234 143.133 159.137 156.979
50 33.427 52.384 69.720 95.470 118.329 133.165 144.156
60 30.552 50.277 68.955 95.161 120.207 139.696 156.764
70 41.031 67.271 91.862 127.021 159.315 183.833 209.797
80 70.835 113.389 150.135 204.224 253.941 285.457 321.687
90 109.947 175.853 229.368 309.328 382.910 428.040 465.715
drop in economic activity causes all VSL/LE’s to decline by a fixed percentage across the
board. The per-capita hit to children will be higher than to others since they have such
high starting VSL/LE baselines. Further, the total impact on each age groupwill be higher
for younger cohorts than older ones because there are more youths than senior citizens.
In the context of a disease whose mortality rates are disproportionately skewed toward
older people, policies designed to curb the spread of disease in order to preserve lives
while simultaneously causing an economic recession thus amount to a transfer of welfare
from young to old. This phenomenon is explored in more detail in the simulations in
Section 5.
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5 The Welfare Impacts of Disease Contagion
Aggregate shocks will affect income and possibly health investment and thus health out-
comes. Aggregate shocks coupled with a global pandemic will also affect the efficiency
of health investment when it comes to generating health outcomes. This is because a
pandemic strains health care systems due to large numbers of people with acute illnesses
requiring immediate care. Indeed, this potential capacity problem was the main reason
why many localities quickly enacted measures to mitigate the spread of COVID-19 in the
early weeks of the contagion. For April andMay, many U.S. localities allowed only essen-
tial medical procedures to occur, so that consumers were forced to put off preventative
care and elective surgeries despite still paying insurance premiums which would cover
such procedures. Money spent for health care during this time was thus spent less ef-
ficiently as multiple weeks and months passed with preventative and elective care put
on hold. Thus, while those policies were implemented to seemingly maintain capacity
and efficiency in the health care system, health outcomes beyond those directly related to
the COVID-19 pandemic may still have been adversely affected. While health efficiency
shocks are represented by a drop in zt, the 2020 recession has also likely brought on resid-
ual shocks to wat. Aside from the adverse residual effects on childhood development
which have been discussed, gym closures may restrict adults’ exercise regimens, and
families confined to close-quarters for months on end may be more likely to engage-in
and/or experience abusive behavior, amongst other possible outcomes.
In terms of the model here, the U.S. economy therefore experienced two simultaneous
aggregate shocks to welfare, independent of health outcomes that directly result from
the COVID-19 pandemic: 1) a reduction in yt affecting health investment choices; 2) a
reduction in ztwat affecting the efficiency of those same choices. COVID-19 overwhelm-
ingly affects individuals with compromised immune systems who are older. The degree
to which COVID-19 causes premature deaths for consumers of different ages combined
with the degree to which consumers of different ages are differentially affected by both
shocks to yt and ztwat will determine how the present crisis adversely impacts individuals
across the age distribution.
In this section, equilibrium outcomes under several scenarios are considered in or-
der to account for uncertainty around the magnitude of the economic shocks, as well
as mortality directly caused by the COVID-19 contagion. Specifically, life expectancies,
and VSL’s for people of all ages change in response to income and health productivity
shocks. Several shock scenarios are simulated relative to a baseline where yt and ztwat
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continue to grow at their pre-COVID rates.6 The simulations can be divided into two
camps: 1) those where both yt and ztwat are shocked, while accounting for differential
COVID-19 mortality risk across the age-distribution; 2) the same as the first simulation,
except replacing COVID-19 mortality risk with age-specific estimates for the 1918 Span-
ish Flu. The latter counterfactual exercise is undertaken in order to assess the importance
of the disease contagion’s age-mortality distribution on both aggregate and distributional
welfare outcomes.
In each broad camp, there are six separate scenarios for income and health productiv-
ity shocks.7 The first income shock scenario builds on the Congressional Budget Office’s
(CBO) May 2020 projections of output loss due to the policy-driven recession (CBO 2020).
The CBO estimates a −5.6% annual growth rate for 2020 followed by 4.2% for 2021. An
L-shaped recession is considered in scenario two, where output falls −5.6% in the first
year and recovers thereafter only at the post-Great Recession rate of 0.98%. Next, a quasi-
V-shaped recession is considered where output falls by 5.6% in 2020 and rises by 5.6%
in 2021. Finally, these exercises are repeated after adjusting the magnitude of the initial
shock to −10%.
The six scenarios for health productivity shocks directly correspond to the income
shock processes. Assume that health productivity shocks and recovery rates are propor-
tional to those of yt. For example, suppose that output continued to grow at the post-
Great Recession rate, and call the level of 2020 per-capita output associated with this
growth y2020. Then, a −5.6% year-on-year shock to 2019 output leads to a reduction in
2020 output relative to y2020 of −0.056 − 0.0098 = −0.0658. Now, note that baseline
gz + gwa can be computed under the assumption that µ = 2/3 and a further assumption
that zt grows at the same rate as yt. In every different shock and recovery scenario and for
each age-a agent in each subsequent period after the shock, the log of age-specific produc-
tivities ztwat can be rescaled by the proportional growth factor (in this example, −0.0658)
6Specifically, assume that had COVID-19 not occurred, yt would continue to grow at its post-Great Re-
cession annual rate of 0.0098 and ztwat would evolve along its constant, age-specific growth path presented
in Figure 2a.
7It should be noted that all shocks are modeled in the “MIT” sense. That is, they occur suddenly and
without expectation. Indeed, consumers and thus the social planner are not thought to have any idea that
such a shock were to ever be possible, thus failing to plan for it. The model is first solved for equilibrium
outcomes using output growth and population projections out to year 2100, assuming that no adverse shock
pertaining to a contagion has occurred in 2020. Then, having equilibrium consumption and health invest-
ment decisions in hand, per-capita income yt and health productivities suddenly decline, corresponding to
the recession and recovery characteristics described above. In this formulation, with a period length of one
year, 2019 is the last period prior to the shock affecting output in 2020. Recovery begins in 2021 in every
scenario, and the simulations are conducted by solving the model backwards from 2100 where per-capita
growth after 2021 is projected out at the model-implied post-Great Recession (after 2009) annual average of
0.98%.
19
relative to the baseline. Having now shocked both yt and ztwat, equilibrium outcomes
can be computed.
5.1 Joint Income and Health Investment Productivity Shocks Account-
ing for COVID-19 Mortality Risk
COVID-19 itself, being an acute event, has little impact on the LE of the young, because
mortality rates from the disease are skewed toward older people. Rather, LE is impacted
through channels residual to the COVID-19 crisis, such as the drop in income and health
investment due to the economic fallout. This section considers the distributional impli-
cations of the economic shutdown while accounting for health productivity shocks and
shocks to mortality directly resulting from the crisis. Indeed, shutting down the economy
amounts to a transfer of welfare from the young to the old. Depending on the ultimate
severity of the crisis, the value of life years lost attributable directly to people dying from
the COVID-19 disease may be exceeded by the value of life years lost due to the non-
COVID-19 residual economic impacts.
Note that the analysis here takes no stand on whether shutting down the economy
to reduce COVID-19 deaths is somehow optimal. Rather, the focus here is on the trade-
off between the value of short-run lives saved and long-run lives lost when VSL’s are
age-dependent and health investment heterogeneity ensures that consumers of different
ages are differentially-affected by economic shocks. Unlike work in Bethune and Korinek
(2020), Eichenbaum, Rebelo, and Trabandt (2020), Glover et al. (2020), and Krueger, Uh-
lig, and Xie (2020) the model here contains no mechanism endogenously linking output
loss to reductions in total disease-related deaths. Rather, income and total disease deaths
are exogenous. Since there is so much uncertainty surrounding how the economic cri-
sis and, ultimately, the disease contagion will play out, this assumption allows for direct
comparison of outcomes under differing degrees of simultaneous economic and disease
contagion. Specifically, the exercises here involve simulating VSL’s and LE’s under dif-
ferent combinations of output shocks and total disease deaths to understand howwelfare
loss is distributed between generations. The goal of such an exercise is to understand
how people of different ages are affected by these simultaneous occurrences.
As of July 9, 2020, over 126,000 people in the U.S. had died of COVID-19 (JHUM 2020).
According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), over 59% of deaths
were individuals 75 years of age or older, and over 80% of deaths were individuals 65
years of age or older (CDC 2020c). Letting mcovida,2020 denote the age-specific mortality rate
from COVID-19 taken from the CDC’s provisional COVID-19 death counts, the mortality
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distribution associated with COVID-19 can be computed. Specifically, since the CDC
currently reports the total number of deaths by age for each week of the pandemic back
to February 1, 2020, there exists data for the conditional age-distribution of all current
COVID-19 mortalities. Figure 4 presents the age-distribution of COVID-19 deaths where
each line corresponds to a different week of the pandemic. Notice that the age-specific
death distribution has been stable over time and skews older.
Figure 4: Age bins are on the horizontal axis. The different lines represent the distribution
of COVID-19 deaths by age conditional on getting the disease for different weeks of the
pandemic. The sample begins the week starting Sunday, March 8, 2020, and concludes
with the week ending Saturday, June 27, 2020 (CDC 2020c). The conditional age-specific
death distribution appears stationary over time.
While Figure 4 shows the probability of dying from COVID-19 conditional on getting
the disease, the age-specific marginal probability of dying from the disease, mcovida,2020, also
depends on the total number of deaths and the population levels of different age groups.
Using the COVID-19 forecasting models presented at the CDC’s main forecasting hub for
4-weeks out,8 mcovida,2020 is computed for seven separate scenarios of total disease deaths: 1)
average 4-week deaths across all models cited by the CDC of 145,224 which is closest to
4-week projections from the Notre Dame-FRED COVID-19 forecasts (ND 2020); 2) maxi-
mal 4-week ahead deaths of 180,226 predicted by Columbia University’s Shaman Group
(CU 2020); 3) 250,000 deaths; 4) 500,000 deaths; 5) 750,000 deaths; 6) 1,000,000 deaths; 7)
1,500,000 deaths; 8) 2,000,000 deaths. Scenarios (3) through (8) account for how the crisis
8See CDC (2020b) for a full list and description of the models the CDC uses for COVID-19 case and death
forecasting and CDC (2020a) for the actual forecasting data.
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may possibly unfold over the next 6-8 months.9
Assume mcovida,2020 is not affected by health investments. In this manner all COVID-19
deaths are treated as accidental. The reasoning behind this assumption is that, given
fixed health care resources entering the period, mitigation of the spread and thus severity
of COVID-19 requires measures to be taken outside the scope of the model — things like
social distancing mandates and forced closure of so-called “non-essential” businesses.
Such policies are further assumed, implicitly, only to impact the total number of deaths,
and thus they exogenously affect mcovida,2020. Finally, the health crisis is assumed to have
resolved itself and disappeared by the end of 2020. While one may wonder how pro-
ductivity variables like zt and wat are not affected by innovations leading to COVID-
19 therapies, consider that improvements to health care efficiency directly pertaining to
COVID-19 treatments likely will not be realized until such treatments are widely avail-
able in the future, probably after the end of 2020. The same goes for the prevalence of
vaccines. In the event that effective cures or vaccines for COVID-19 are found after 2020,
such improvements will be captured by future productivities. The crisis associated with
COVID-19 is thus limited to the initial, latent period prior to the development and wide
dissemination of such treatments, after which COVID-19 is treated in this exercise just
like any other disease that circulates widely amongst the populace. Modeling mcovida,2020 as
exogenous in 2020 reflects the acute nature of the initial spread. After 2020, deaths caused
by mcovida,2020 will be assumed to be folded into m
non
at and directly affected by health produc-
tivities and investments. That is, for all t , 2020, mcovidat = 0. The inverse mortality rate in
2020 is xa,2020 =
1
macca,2020+m
covid
a,2020+1/x˜a,2020
.
The main mechanism affecting LE’s and VSL’s is the reduction in survival rates driven
by reductions in health investments due both to falling health productivities and income.
Since aggregate health investment is not a directly-targeted data moment in the model
calibration, for the results presented here to be taken seriously, endogenous health in-
vestment generated by the model’s equilibrium should resemble real-world measures
of health investment. Particularly, we should care about how changes in health invest-
ment resulting from the modeled income and health productivity shocks match observed
changes in health investment in the data. Note that personal health care spending fell
-1.5% year-on-year from the first quarter of 2019 to 2020. Figure 5 compares how simu-
lated equilibrium aggregate health investments under COVID-19 scenario number one,
assuming 145,224 deaths, vary year-on-year compared to aggregate personal health care
9Recall, however, that since we are analyzing a one-year model period, death shocks associated with the
crisis are modeled as aggregates over all of 2020. For this reason, projections (1) and (2) are on the lower
end of possible outcomes.
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investment data from NIPA. The data are in quarterly intervals but the simulated out-
comes are in annual intervals. Notice that the last data point (blue dot) presented for
first quarter 2020 resides along the model-predicted path of decline in aggregate health
investment. It should be noted, however, that model predictions account for variation in
both personal spending and government spending, so the comparison is not exact unless
it is assumed that government health investment and personal health investment decline
equally in response to the COVID-19 crisis. Under the current crisis it is not unreasonable
to assume this since precautionary and elective procedures both for patients using private
health insurance and those using government Medicare or Medicaid have been limited
for certain periods.
Figure 5: The statistic presented here is annual rates of change of aggregate health invest-
ment. The colored lines represent simulated equilibrium aggregate health investment,
and the blue dots represent data points for personal consumption expenditure on health
care. Since the shocks are simulated in the “MIT”-sense — suddenly and unexpectedly
— there are no deviations in aggregate health spending amongst the different model sim-
ulations prior to the 2020 recession.
With a satisfactory model fit, we can now analyze the welfare implications of the
shock. To understand the effects across the age-distribution, let LEat describe the baseline
life expectancy in the constant-growth economy and L˜Eat describe life expectancies, inde-
pendent of COVID-19 risk, in one of the shocked economies. Recall, the constant growth
economy is assumed to feature continued growth in income per-capita of gy = 0.0098,
the post-Great Recession growth rate. Let VSLat be the endogenous baseline VSL for age-
a consumers in period t in the no-recession, constant growth simulation and V˜SLat be
the VSL independent of COVID-19 risk for one of the shocked economies. The goal is to
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show how long it takes LE’s to recover from the recession, and compare VSL welfare loss
due to non-COVID-19 factors against VSL’s lost due to COVID-19 deaths. Lost life years
per-capita due to non-COVID-19 factors relative to the 2020 baseline are
L˜Eat − LEa,2020 (10)
The per-capita consumption value of each COVID-19 death is measured as foregone base-
line VSL’s
VSLa,2020 m
covid
a,2020 (11)
Meanwhile, the consumption value of lost life years per-capita due to non-COVID-19
factors resulting from the economic fallout is just the statistic
(
VSLat/LEat − V˜SLat/L˜Eat
)︸                                  ︷︷                                  ︸
∆ VSL Per Year of Life
×
(
LEat − L˜Eat
)︸              ︷︷              ︸
∆ Life Expectancy
∀a, t (12)
The units of this statistic are 2018 dollars. Note that unlike the statistic in (10), the statistic
in (12) does not directly describe how long it takes for VSL’s to recover from the recession
but rather how welfare deviates from a no-shock baseline along the growth path.
Figure 6 shows the deviations of age-specific life expectancies from pre-pandemic lev-
els described by the statistic in (10). Note that L˜Eat represents simulated life expectancies
by age after subtracting out lost life years directly attributable to the COVID-19 epidemic.
Thus, all reductions in life expectancy relative to the baseline are driven by the declines
in income and health productivities. The idea here is to understand two things: 1) how
long it takes for life expectancy to recover to where it was at the dawn of the recession;
2) how such a recovery varies by age group. In the most severe cases (-10% 2020 shock
followed by slow recoveries), life expectancy fails to return to the baseline 2020 level by
2025. This can be seen by noting that the yellow line is below zero for all age groups in
panels (d) and (e). Depending on the severity of the recession, younger agents initially
lose anywhere from 0.5 to 0.8 life years. Depending on the shape of the recovery, life ex-
pectancies may return to the predicted 2020 baseline faster, as in the quick recoveries of
panels (a), (c), and (f), where the 2025 life-expectancy profiles have essentially returned to
pre-pandemic levels. Still, this exercise shows just how severe the effects a recession that
includes simultaneous health productivity shocks may be.
Table 2 presents the value of lost VSL’s due to the disease crisis and economic fall-
out. The top half of the table shows the breakdown in VSL’s lost due to COVID-19 and
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(a) -5.6% 2020, 4.6% 2021 (b) -5.6% 2020, 0.98% 2021 (c) -5.6% 2020, 5.6% 2021
(d) -10% 2020, 4.6% 2021 (e) -10% 2020, 0.98% 2021 (f) -10% 2020, 10% 2021
Figure 6: Age is presented on the horizontal axes and deviation in LE relative to that
for the no-shock, constant-growth 2020 baseline level is presented on the vertical axes.
In this figure, we only consider simulations where total COVID-19 deaths at the end of
2020 are 250,000, a large but not implausible value. The blue lines describe the lost years
of LE by age group in 2020, with the red lines corresponding to the same distribution of
outcomes for 2021, the gold lines for 2025, and the violet lines for 2030. Panels (a) through
(c) show how LE by age group deviates from a no-shock environment in response to the
CBO-predicted 5.6% decline in output followed by various recovery paths. Panels (d)
through (f) show how life expectancy deviates from the baseline under a steeper, 10%
annual decline in 2020 output. In most cases, it takes until at least 2025 before LE’s have
returned to their pre-pandemic levels.
non-COVID-19 factors while the bottom half shows the total social loss in VSL’s as the
sum of the two components. A policymaker looking to reduce aggregate welfare loss due
to COVID-19 deaths must first have an idea of how many deaths would occur if no so-
cial distancing were in place. Some early models starkly suggested that 1,000,000 people
could die in the U.S. if no measures were taken (Ferguson et al. 2020). In such a situ-
ation, with no economic shutdown, lost lives due to COVID-19 would amount to $2.46
trillion. If such projections are believable then policies that lead to economic shutdowns
in order to curb disease-spread may be preferred, but only as long as total VSL’s lost
are reduced relative to the predictive baseline. Relative to the no-recession scenario with
1,000,000 deaths, a policy which reduces deaths to approximately 250,000 at the expense
of a -5.6% economic contraction is aggregate welfare improving. However, excessively
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Table 2: 2020 Lost Social Welfare Measured in Total VSL’s in Trillions of 2018$
COVID-19 VSL’s Lost a; VSL’s Lost Due to Non-COVID-19 Factors b
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
COVID-19
Deaths
−5.6%, 4.6% −5.6%, 0.98% −5.6%, 5.6% −10%, 4.6% −10%, 0.98% −10%, 10%
145,224 0.357; 1.544 0.357; 1.679 0.357; 1.487 0.357; 4.097 0.357; 4.318 0.357; 3.720
180,226 0.443; 1.544 0.443; 1.679 0.443; 1.487 0.443; 4.097 0.443; 4.318 0.443; 3.720
250,000 0.615; 1.544 0.615; 1.679 0.615; 1.487 0.615; 4.097 0.615; 4.317 0.615; 3.720
500,000 1.230; 1.544 1.230; 1.679 1.230; 1.487 1.230; 4.097 1.230; 4.317 1.230; 3.720
750,000 1.846; 1.544 1.846; 1.679 1.846; 1.487 1.846; 4.097 1.846; 4.317 1.846; 3.720
1,000,000 2.461; 1.544 2.461; 1.679 2.461; 1.487 2.461; 4.096 2.461; 4.317 2.461; 3.719
1,500,000 3.691; 1.543 3.691; 1.679 3.691; 1.487 3.691; 4.096 3.691; 4.316 3.691; 3.719
2,000,000 4.922; 1.543 4.922; 1.679 4.922; 1.486 4.922; 4.096 4.922; 4.316 4.922; 3.719
Total Lost VSL’s c
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
COVID-19
Deaths
−5.6%, 4.6% −5.6%, 0.98% −5.6%, 5.6% −10%, 4.6% −10%, 0.98% −10%, 10%
145,224 1.901 2.036 1.844 4.454 4.675 4.077
180,226 1.987 2.122 1.930 4.540 4.761 4.163
250,000 2.159 2.294 2.102 4.712 4.932 4.335
500,000 2.774 2.909 2.717 5.327 5.547 4.95
750,000 3.390 3.525 3.333 5.557 5.863 5.566
1,000,000 4.005 4.140 3.948 6.557 6.778 6.180
1,500,000 5.234 5.370 5.179 7.787 8.007 7.410
2,000,000 6.465 6.601 6.108 9.018 9.238 8.641
NOTE: In the top half of the table, VSL’s lost due to COVID-19 deaths are presented on the left side of the
semicolon, while lost VSL’s due to the economic fallout are on the right side. When the left-hand side
exceeds the right-hand side, COVID-19 causes greater direct welfare loss than the economic fallout.
a This value is ∑a VSLatm
covid
at where t = 2020.
b This value is ∑a Nat
(
VSLat/LEat − V˜SLat/L˜Eat
)(
LEat − L˜Eat
)
where t = 2020.
c This value is ∑a VSLatm
covid
at + ∑a Nat
(
VSLat/LEat − V˜SLat/L˜Eat
)(
LEat − L˜Eat
)
where t = 2020.
stringent policies that lead to, say, a -10% contraction would increase lost VSL’s due to
non-COVID-19 factors faster than VSL’s saved due to preventing disease deaths.
This story is contingent on the Ferguson et al. (2020) predictions being correct. Sup-
pose, instead, that 750,000 deaths were ex-ante expected, leading to $1.85 trillion in lost
VSL’s due to disease deaths. In this scenario, inducing an economic contraction to miti-
gate disease spread is not welfare improving under any of the simulated scenarios. Though
there does exist a scenario where a very mild economic contraction associated with social-
distancingmandates can bewelfare-improving if baseline-predicted total deaths are 750,000
or less, projections suggest that the 2020 recession is far from mild. To determine which
disease-mitigation policies are socially optimal, it is important to have both reasonably-
confident predictions regarding total deaths and the economic fallout from the policy.
The acceleration of COVID-19 cases at the end of June and beginning of July 2020 has
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posed an emerging problem for policymakers. Having shut down much of the economy
inMarch, April, andMay tomitigate the disease spread, many local and state leaders dur-
ing the summer of 2020 have been faced with the difficult decision whether to mandate
social-distancing once again. It is questionable as to whether the public has the appetite
for such policies. Suppose, hypothetically, that the summer resurgence forces total 2020
COVID-19 deaths closer to 500,000, while the recession remains around -5.6% followed by
4.6% growth in 2021. Relative to a baseline of 1,000,000 deaths and no recession, 500,000
deaths and the CBO-predicted contraction amounts to a reduction in aggregate welfare,
from a loss of $2.461 trillion to $2.774 trillion. In such a case, the policy-induced reces-
sion of the spring of 2020 will have been wasted if deaths spike and the total death rate
increases substantially. Under this hypothetical scenario, the model’s welfare measures
suggest a rather unpalatable outcome: it would have been social-welfare improving to do
nothing and let the disease spread, sacrificing one million, mostly older, lives.
Figure 7 illustrates how both the COVID-19 disease contagion and the residual eco-
nomic crisis have disparate effects on thewelfare of different age-cohorts. The age-specific
values of (11) and (12) weighted by cohort population Nat for the year 2020 under differ-
ent disease-death and economic-shock scenarios are presented. The more red area in the
figures, the greater the welfare hit due to the recession, while greater blue area corre-
sponds to a more intense welfare hit due to disease deaths. The disparity between VSL’s
lost from COVID-19 versus economic factors is driven primarily by the aggregate hit ex-
perienced by younger cohorts from the economic fallout. In most cases non-COVID-19
factors have a greater aggregate impact on welfare than COVID-19 itself. This is again
due to the fact that there are just more younger and working-age adults who are less sus-
ceptible to death from the disease. The deeper the economic shock, say -10% versus -5.6%,
the greater VSL’s lost due to non-COVID-19 factors, and young agents shoulder a greater
share of the aggregate welfare burden. It is thus apparent that policy-induced economic
shocks amount to a transfer of welfare from young to old, which is a direct consequence
of the unique mortality profile of the disease.
The COVID-19 disease has high mortality rates for elderly consumers, but the eco-
nomic fallout of the disease impacts young peoplemore, as long as total COVID-19 deaths
remain below some threshold. Youths are particularly burdened by the reduction in the
consumption value of life brought on from indirect factors. Both reduced LE’s and re-
duced VSL’s per-year of life remaining directly impact young people more than actual
COVID-19 deaths. Disparities in the adverse welfare consequences wrought by both the
disease and economic contagions are a direct result of the age-specific mortality rates of
the COVID-19 disease. Indeed, if young people were more likely to die from the disease,
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(a) -5.6%, 4.6%; 180,226 Deaths (b) -5.6%, 4.6%; 500,000 Deaths (c) -5.6%, 4.6%; 1,000,000 Deaths
(d) -10%, 4.6%; 180,226 Deaths (e) -10%, 4.6%; 500,000 Deaths (f) -10%, 4.6%; 1,000,000 Deaths
Figure 7: The horizontal axes index age while the vertical axes present the sums, over all
age-a individuals, of VSL’s lost due either to the COVID-19 disease (blue) or non-COVID-
19 factors resulting from the economic fallout (red). Model results under 2020 COVID-19
deaths of 180,226, 500,000, and 1,000,000 are shown. Panels (a) through (c) feature the
CBO’s predicted aggregate shock of -5.6% followed by a 4.6% recovery in 2021. Panels (d)
through (f) feature a deeper shock of -10% followed by a 4.6% recovery in 2021. Shaded
areas comprise the difference between lives lost due to COVID-19 versus long-run factors
(blue) and vice-versa (red). The more red area that is shaded, the greater the hit to long-
run VSL’s. The more blue area that is shaded, the greater the hit due to COVID-19 deaths.
When the blue area exceeds the red area, the value of lives lost due to COVID-19 exceeds
the value of statistical lives lost due to indirect, economic factors. The reverse is also true.
the welfare consequences of an economic shutdown designed to contain its spread would
be less dramatic. In such a situation reducing commerce to save lives may be a welfare-
improving strategy. However, given the underlying nature of COVID-19, this seems to
only be true if the disease is indeed very deadly and the policy-induced recession is not
too deep. Otherwise, lost VSL’s due to the economic shutdown outweigh the value of
potential increases in lost lives due to the disease if such a shutdown had not taken place.
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Figure 8: Age is on the horizontal axis. The distribution of total disease-related deaths by
age is more heavily skewed to the right for COVID-19. The Spanish Flu of 1918, mean-
while, had a more pronounced effect on children and young adults.
5.2 Inverted Disease Contagion Mortality Rates: What if the Spanish
Flu Occurred in 2020?
To assess the degree to which the age-specific mortality profile of the COVID-19 disease
contributes to the above conclusions, consider COVID-19 in contrast to the mortality pro-
file of the 1918 Spanish Flu. Unlike COVID-19, the Spanish Flu disproportionately af-
fected younger people, which can be seen by inspecting Figure 8 (Luk, Gross, and Thomp-
son 2001; Gagnon et al. 2013). The data used for Spanish Flumortality rates in the analysis
presented here comes from Luk, Gross, and Thompson (2001).10
In the simulations here, mcovidat is replaced with m
spanish
at . In Luk, Gross, and Thomp-
son (2001) age-specific mortality rates are displayed as number of deaths per 100,000. By
applying their mortality distribution to a conceptual 2020 pandemic, it would thus be
assumed that the underlying total mortality rate for the Spanish Flu in 1918 would be
the same as if the disease had occurred today. This would imply Spanish Flu deaths
of 1,115,900 given the U.S. population distribution in 2020. But it may be too strong
to assume that the Spanish Flu would be as deadly today as it was in 1918, given ad-
vancements in hygiene, early disease detection, health care technology, and our general
10Luk, Gross, and Thompson (2001) present mortality rates for broad, 10-year age groups. To arrive
at the one-year age groups, the same interpolation scheme as that used for the health spending data is
performed here, where it is assumed that all ages within the age group experience the same mortality rate.
This generates the stair-step mortality profile in Figure 8.
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knowledge as to how diseases spread. To accommodate these possibilities, consider the
same eight scenarios for total number of deaths as in Section 5.1 while also simulating the
shocks to income and health productivities in the same six ways as before.
Table 3: 2020 Spanish Flu Counterfactual Lost Social Welfare in Trillions of 2018$
Spanish Flu VSL’s Lost; VSL’s Lost Due to Non-Spanish-Flu Factors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Spanish Flu
Deaths
−5.6%, 4.6% −5.6%, 0.98% −5.6%, 5.6% −10%, 4.6% −10%, 0.98% −10%, 10%
145,224 1.096; 1.544 1.096; 1.680 1.096; 1.487 1.096; 4.097 1.096; 4.318 1.096; 3.720
180,226 1.359; 1.544 1.359; 1.680 1.359; 1.487 1.359; 4.097 1.359; 4.318 1.359; 3.720
250,000 1.886; 1.544 1.886; 1.680 1.886; 1.487 1.886; 4.097 1.886; 4.318 1.886; 3.720
500,000 3.771; 1.544 3.771; 1.680 3.771; 1.487 3.771; 4.097 3.771; 4.318 3.771; 3.720
750,000 5.657; 1.544 5.657; 1.680 5.657; 1.487 5.657; 4.097 5.657; 4.318 5.657; 3.720
1,000,000 7.543; 1.544 7.543; 1.680 7.543; 1.487 7.543; 4.097 7.543; 4.318 7.543; 3.720
1,500,000 11.314; 1.544 11.314; 1.680 11.314; 1.487 11.314; 4.097 11.314; 4.318 11.314; 3.720
2,000,000 15.085; 1.544 15.085; 1.680 15.085; 1.487 15.085; 4.097 15.085; 4.318 15.085; 3.720
Total Lost VSL’s
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Spanish Flu
Deaths
−5.6%, 4.6% −5.6%, 0.98% −5.6%, 5.6% −10%, 4.6% −10%, 0.98% −10%, 10%
145,224 2.640 2.775 2.583 5.193 5.413 4.816
180,226 2.903 3.039 2.847 5.457 5.677 5.080
250,000 3.430 3.565 3.373 5.983 6.203 5.606
500,000 5.315 5.451 5.259 7.869 8.089 7.492
750,000 7.201 7.337 7.144 9.754 9.975 9.377
1,000,000 9.087 9.222 9.030 11.640 11.860 11.263
1,500,000 12.858 12.994 12.801 15.411 15.632 15.034
2,000,000 16.629 16.765 16.573 19.183 19.403 18.806
NOTE: This table is the hypothetical Spanish-Flu analog of Table 2 after replacing mcovidat with m
spanish
at in
the various statistics.
A disease like the Spanish Flu, which affects young more than old, delivers a larger
blow to aggregate welfare at every total-death level, since young agents have such high
baseline VSL’s and there are so many of them relative to their elders. In Table 3 the same
aggregate welfare measures for the Spanish Flu counterfactual are presented as in Table
2. In the top half of the table it can be seen that under the CBO’s economic shock scenario
in column 1, the value of Spanish Flu deaths (left) exceeds lost VSL’s due to indirect
economic factors (right) for all but the lowest death totals. When the economic shock is
more severe, this threshold increases, as can be seen in columns 4 through 6.
Notice that the VSL’s lost due to the recession in the top half of the table are almost the
same as for COVID-19, yet the VSL’s lost directly from the Spanish Flu are far higher. The
Spanish Flu is more costly because its age-distribution of mortality rates skews younger.
A policymaker trading off 2,000,000 deaths in the event of no recession and no social dis-
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tancing would be willing to accept a 10% drop in output and a slow recovery for 1,000,000
deaths, as in row 4 and columns 4 through 6 of the bottom half, in order to reduce lost so-
cial welfare.11 Contrast this with the COVID-19 disease where a 10% reduction in output
is only optimal if projected deaths would dramatically fall from 2,000,000 absent social
distancing to < 250,000, depending on the nature of the recovery.12 This exercise thus
highlights the importance the mortality distribution plays in determining optimal public
health policy.
(a) -5.6%, 4.6%; 180,226 Deaths (b) -5.6%, 4.6%; 500,000 Deaths (c) -5.6%, 4.6%; 1,000,000 Deaths
(d) -10%, 4.6%; 180,226 Deaths (e) -10%, 4.6%; 500,00 Deaths (f) -10%, 4.6%; 1,000,000 Deaths
Figure 9: The horizontal axes index age while the vertical axes present the sum, over all
age-a individuals, of VSL’s lost due either to a hypothetical 2020 outbreak of the Spanish
Flu (blue) or other factors resulting from the economic fallout (red). Panels (a) through (c)
feature the CBO’s predicted aggregate shock of -5.6% followed by 4.6% recovery in 2021.
Panels (d) through (f) feature a deeper shock of -10% followed by a 4.6% recovery in 2021.
Shaded areas comprise the difference between lives lost due to Spanish Flu versus long-
run factors (blue) and vice-versa (red). The more red area that is shaded, the greater the
hit to long-run VSL’s. The more blue area that is shaded, the greater the hit due to Spanish
Flu deaths.
In terms of the welfare effects across the age distribution, the risk-profile of the Span-
11To see this, compare the number to the left of the semicolon in the top half of the table. Since VSL’s for
deaths are measured as VSL’s lost relative to the baseline economy where no economic shock occurs, the
statistic representing Spanish Flu VSL’s lost measures welfare loss in an economy plagued by disease but
still growing along the balanced growth path.
12Utilize the same comparison as here: inspect the value to the left of the semicolons in the last row of
the top half of Table 2 and compare it to total VSL’s lost in the bottom half of the same table in the event of
a recession that also reduces total deaths.
31
ish Flu leads to a generational divide that is the opposite of that induced by COVID-19.
Notice in Figure 9 that younger consumers experience a double-whammy, with long-run
VSL harmed by the economic contagion at the same time that many die due to Span-
ish Flu. Indeed, in Figure 9f when the economic shock is deep and 1,000,000 people die
from the disease, long-run VSL’s lost by older adults exceed their age-specific hit from the
disease, while the opposite is true for the young.
This counterfactual exercise thus demonstrates how the nature of disease risk impacts
welfare inference. If COVID-19 had the same mortality risk profile as the Spanish Flu,
policies encouraging economic shutdowns to mitigate disease spread may be preferred,
especially if they lead to a total reduction in VSL’s lost. However, overly-restrictive poli-
cies could still cause greater aggregate welfare loss if the underlying death rate of the
disease is mis-estimated. In contrast to a disease like COVID-19, the aggregate welfare
loss of the old due to a slight reduction in output is smaller than under COVID-19. This
is because less old people are alive at the start of the contagion anyway, they are less
affected by the disease, and their VSL’s are lower to begin with.
6 Conclusion
This paper explores the age-distributional welfare implications of disease contagion through
the lens of an overlapping generations model with endogenous health status, survival
rates, and health investment that generates age-dependent estimates of life expectancies
and the value of statistical lives. These model-implied statistics are used to quantity the
welfare implications of simultaneous recessions and disease contagions. Estimated VSL’s
using revealed preferences for health investment are declining in age and are particularly
high for children and young adults. Given the age-profile of VSL’s, it is shown that eco-
nomic shocks, independent of disease contagions, disproportionately harm young people
if death-risk skews older. Finally, it is shown that the degree to which the adverse effects
of the recession dominate those of the disease depend both on the age-mortality profile
of the disease and its overall deadliness.
Through this lens, the intergenerational distributional implications of the 2020 COVID-
19 crisis are profound. While the actual COVID-19 virus may take the lives of older in-
dividuals at higher rates, it is the younger generations that appear to bear the long-run
costs of the crisis, regardless of whether social-distancing efforts actually lead to aggre-
gate welfare improvements. This is apparent while even abstracting from possibly unbal-
anced income shocks that may affect young people more. It is thus shown, in a planner’s
problem where the only objective is to efficiently allocate resources across generations,
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that the costs of this crisis are born by younger cohorts. This is a direct consequence of
the mortality profile of COVID-19: if COVID-19 were instead more like the Spanish Flu,
social distancing mandates that lead to substantial income losses are more likely to be
welfare improving.
Moving forward, researchers should more deeply explore the implications of this ex-
ercise by examining microeconomic data pertaining to the effect of the shutdown on the
health and welfare of children and young adults. While the results here are extrapolatory
in nature due to being estimated during the early innings of the 2020 COVID-19 crisis,
they should provide a useful framework to help both researchers and policymakers form
new questions. Namely, if the intergenerational welfare disparities are indeed true, how
can we minimize the harm to young people while still preserving lives? Perhaps policies
that encourage school and work attendance for children and young adults could sup-
plement social-distancing recommendations that target at-risk, older individuals. Such a
nuanced approach, among others, could help minimize the intergenerational welfare hit
to young while still keeping the mortality rates of the disease in check.
References
Alderman, Harold, John Hoddinott, and Bill Kinsey. 2006. “Long term consequences of
early childhood malnutrition”. Oxford Economic Papers 58 (3): 450–474. (Cit. on p. 5).
Aldy, Joseph E, and W Kip Viscusi. 2008. “Adjusting the value of a statistical life for age
and cohort effects”. The Review of Economics and Statistics 90 (3): 573–581. (Cit. on pp. 7,
8).
Ananat, Elizabeth Oltmans, et al. 2011. Children left behind: The effects of statewide job loss on
student achievement. Tech. rep. National Bureau of Economic Research. (Cit. on p. 6).
Barling, Julian, Kathryne E Dupre, and C Gail Hepburn. 1998. “Effects of parents’ job
insecurity on children’s work beliefs and attitudes.” Journal of Applied Psychology 83
(1): 112. (Cit. on p. 6).
Barling, Julian, Anthea Zacharatos, and C Gail Hepburn. 1999. “Parents’ job insecurity
affects children’s academic performance through cognitive difficulties.” Journal of Ap-
plied Psychology 84 (3): 437. (Cit. on p. 6).
Barro, Robert J, José F Ursúa, and JoannaWeng. 2020. The coronavirus and the great influenza
pandemic: Lessons from the “spanish flu” for the coronavirus’s potential effects on mortality
and economic activity. Tech. rep. National Bureau of Economic Research. (Cit. on p. 4).
33
Bethune, Zachary, and Anton Korinek. 2020. Covid-19 infection externalities: Trading off lives
vs livelihoods. Tech. rep. National Bureau of Economic Research. (Cit. on pp. 3, 4, 20).
Black, Sandra, and Kenneth Sokoloff. 2006. “Long-Term Trends in Schooling: The Rise and
Decline (?) of Public Education in the United States”, 1st ed., ed. by Eric Hanushek and
Fins Welch. Amsterdam: Elsevier. (Cit. on p. 5).
Boyer, Bruce A, and Amy E Halbrook. 2011. “Advocating for children in care in a climate
of economic recession: The relationship between poverty and child maltreatment”.
Nw. JL & Soc. Pol’y 6:300. (Cit. on p. 6).
Byl, Jacob P. 2013. “Protecting the innocent with a premium for child safety regulations”.
U. Mass. L. Rev. 8:264. (Cit. on p. 7).
Campbell, Frances, et al. 2014. “Early childhood investments substantially boost adult
health”. Science 343 (6178): 1478–1485. (Cit. on pp. 4–6).
CBO. 2020. Interim Economic Projections for 2020 and 2021. Online; accessed July 9, 2020.
Congress of the United States; Congressional Budget Office. https://www.cbo.gov/
system/files/2020-05/56351-CBO-interim-projections.pdf. (Cit. on p. 19).
CDC. 2020a. 2020-06-29-model-data. Online; accessed July 6, 2020. Centers for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention. https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/covid-data/
files/2020-06-29-model-data.csv. (Cit. on p. 21).
— . 2020b. Forecasts of Total Deaths. Online; accessed July 6, 2020. Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention. https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/covid-
data/forecasting-us.html. (Cit. on p. 21).
— . 2020c. Provisional COVID-19 Death Counts by Sex, Age, and Week. Online; accessed July
6, 2020. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. https://data.cdc.gov/NCHS/
Provisional- COVID- 19- Death- Counts- by- Sex- Age- and- W/vsak- wrfu/data.
(Cit. on pp. 20, 21).
Chay, Kenneth, and Michael Greenstone. 2003. “The Impact of Air Pollution on Infant
Mortality: Evidence from Geographic Variation in Pollution Shocks Induced by a Re-
cession”. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 118 (3): 1121–1167. (Cit. on p. 5).
CMS. 2019. Age and Gender: Health Expenditures by Age and Gender. Online; accessed July 6,
2020. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. https://www.cms.gov/Research-
Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/
Age-and-Gender. (Cit. on p. 12).
34
Conger, Rand D, and M Brent Donnellan. 2007. “An interactionist perspective on the so-
cioeconomic context of human development”. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 58:175–199. (Cit. on
p. 6).
Correia, Sergio, Stephan Luck, and Emil Verner. 2020. “Pandemics Depress the Economy,
Public Health Interventions Do Not: Evidence from the 1918 Flu”. Revision, June 11,
2020, SSRN Working Paper. (Cit. on p. 4).
Corso, Phaedra S, Xiangming Fang, and James A Mercy. 2011. “Benefits of preventing a
death associated with child maltreatment: Evidence from willingness-to-pay survey
data”. American Journal of Public Health 101 (3): 487–490. (Cit. on p. 8).
CU. 2020. COVID-19 Findings, Simulations. Online; accessed July 6, 2020. Columbia Uni-
versity, ShamanGroup. https://blogs.cuit.columbia.edu/jls106/publications/
covid-19-findings-simulations/. (Cit. on p. 21).
Cunha, Flavio, et al. 2006. “Interpreting the evidence on life cycle skill formation”. Hand-
book of the Economics of Education 1:697–812. (Cit. on p. 6).
Cutler, David, Angus Deaton, and Adriana Lleras-Muney. 2006. “The determinants of
mortality”. Journal of Economic Perspectives 20 (3): 97–120. (Cit. on p. 12).
Dehejia, Rajeev, and Adriana Lleras-Muney. 2004. “Booms, Busts, and Babies’ Health”.
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 119 (3): 1091–1130. (Cit. on p. 5).
Eichenbaum, Martin S, Sergio Rebelo, and Mathias Trabandt. 2020. The macroeconomics of
epidemics. Tech. rep. National Bureau of Economic Research. (Cit. on pp. 3, 20).
Evans, Gary W, and Pilyoung Kim. 2007. “Childhood poverty and health: Cumulative
risk exposure and stress dysregulation”. Psychological Science 18 (11): 953–957. (Cit. on
p. 6).
Evans, GaryW, andMichelle A Schamberg. 2009. “Childhood poverty, chronic stress, and
adult working memory”. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 106 (16): 6545–
6549. (Cit. on p. 6).
Ferguson, Neil, et al. 2020. Report 9: Impact of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) to
reduce COVID19 mortality and healthcare demand. Tech. rep. Imperial College COVID-19
Response Team. (Cit. on pp. 25, 26).
Ferreira, Francisco, andNorbert Schady. 2009. “Aggregate Economic Shocks, Child School-
ing, and Child Health”. The World Bank Research Observer 24 (2): 147–181. (Cit. on p. 5).
Fogel, RobertWilliam, et al. 2004. The escape from hunger and premature death, 1700-2100: Eu-
rope, America, and the Third World. Vol. 38. Cambridge University Press. (Cit. on p. 12).
35
Gagnon, Alain, et al. 2013. “Age-specific mortality during the 1918 influenza pandemic:
unravelling the mystery of high young adult mortality”. PLoS One 8 (8). (Cit. on p. 29).
Glover, Andrew, et al. 2020. Health versus wealth: On the distributional effects of controlling a
pandemic. Tech. rep. National Bureau of Economic Research. (Cit. on pp. 3, 4, 20).
Goldin, Claudia. 1999. “Egalitarianism and the Returns to Education during the Great
Transformation of American Education”. Journal of Political Economy 107 (S6): S65–S94.
(Cit. on p. 5).
Grossman, Michael. 2005. “Education and Nonmarket Outcomes”. In Handbook on the
Economics of Education, ed. by Eric Hanushek and Finis Welch. Amsterdam: North-
Holland. (Cit. on p. 12).
Hall, Robert E., and Charles I. Jones. 2004. The Value of Life and the Rise in Health Spending.
Tech. rep. National Bureau of Economic Research. (Cit. on pp. 10, 11).
— . 2007. “The Value of Life and the Rise in Health Spending”. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics 122 (1): 39–72. (Cit. on pp. 1, 3, 7–12, 15).
Hammitt, James K, and Kevin Haninger. 2010. “Valuing fatal risks to children and adults:
Effects of disease, latency, and risk aversion”. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 40 (1): 57–
83. (Cit. on p. 8).
Hayashi, Fumio. 2000. “Econometrics”. (Cit. on p. 12).
Heckman, James, Rodrigo Pinto, and Peter Savelyev. 2013. “Understanding the mecha-
nisms throughwhich an influential early childhood program boosted adult outcomes”.
American Economic Review 103 (6): 2052–86. (Cit. on p. 4).
Heckman, James J. 2008. “The case for investing in disadvantaged young children”. CE-
Sifo DICE Report 6 (2): 3–8. (Cit. on p. 4).
Hintermann, Beat, Anna Alberini, and Anil Markandya. 2010. “Estimating the value of
safety with labour market data: Are the results trustworthy?” Applied Economics 42 (9):
1085–1100. (Cit. on p. 7).
Hoddinott, John, et al. 2011. “The consequences of early childhood growth failure over
the life course”. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute Discussion
Paper 1073. (Cit. on p. 5).
Horenstein, Alex R, and Manuel S Santos. 2019. “Understanding Growth Patterns in US
Health Care Expenditures”. Journal of the European Economic Association 17 (1): 284–326.
(Cit. on p. 12).
36
Jenkins, Robin R, Nicole Owens, and Lanelle Bembenek Wiggins. 2001. “Valuing reduced
risks to children: the case of bicycle safety helmets”. Contemporary Economic Policy 19
(4): 397–408. (Cit. on p. 7).
Jensen, Robert. 2000. “Agricultural volatility and investments in children”. American Eco-
nomic Review 90 (2): 399–404. (Cit. on p. 5).
JHUM. 2020. Coronavirus Resource Center. Online; accessed July 9, 2020. Johns Hopkins
University & Medicine. https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html. (Cit. on p. 20).
Kalil, Ariel. 2013. “Effects of the great recession on child development”. The ANNALS of
the American Academy of Political and Social Science 650 (1): 232–250. (Cit. on pp. 5, 6).
Karaca-Mandic, Pinar, Sung J Choi Yoo, and Benjamin D Sommers. 2013. “Recession led
to a decline in out-of-pocket spending for children with special health care needs”.
Health Affairs 32 (6): 1054–1062. (Cit. on p. 5).
Kim, Pilyoung, et al. 2013. “Effects of childhood poverty and chronic stress on emotion
regulatory brain function in adulthood”. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
110 (46): 18442–18447. (Cit. on p. 6).
Kind, Michael, and John P Haisken-DeNew. 2012. “Sons’ unexpected long term scarring
due to fathers’ unemployment”. Ruhr Economic Paper, no. 375. (Cit. on p. 6).
Kniesner, Thomas J, and W Kip Viscusi. 2019. “The Value of a Statistical Life”. Forthcom-
ing, Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Economics and Finance: 19–15. (Cit. on pp. 7, 16).
Krueger, Dirk, Harald Uhlig, and Taojun Xie. 2020.Macroeconomic dynamics and reallocation
in an epidemic. Tech. rep. National Bureau of Economic Research. (Cit. on pp. 4, 20).
Leigh, J Paul. 1995. “Compensating wages, value of a statistical life, and inter-industry
differentials”. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 28 (1): 83–97. (Cit. on
p. 7).
Leininger, Lindsey, and Ariel Kalil. 2012. “Parents’ Financial Stress and Children’s Beav-
ior Problems in the Aftermath of the Great Recession”. In Annual meeting of the Associ-
ation for public policy Analysis, November, Baltimore, MD. (Cit. on p. 6).
Luk, Jeffrey, Peter Gross, and William W Thompson. 2001. “Observations on mortality
during the 1918 influenza pandemic”. Clinical Infectious Diseases 33 (8): 1375–1378. (Cit.
on p. 29).
Meara, Ellen, Chapin White, and David M Cutler. 2004. “Trends in medical spending by
age, 1963-2000”. Health Affairs 23 (4): 176–183. (Cit. on pp. 11, 12).
37
Miller, Ted R. 2000. “Variations between countries in values of statistical life”. Journal of
Transport Economics and Policy: 169–188. (Cit. on p. 7).
ND. 2020.Notre Dame-FRED COVID-19 forecasts. Online; accessed July 6, 2020. University
of Notre Dame, Perkins Lab. https : / / github . com / confunguido / covid19 _ ND _
forecasting. (Cit. on p. 21).
Nikulina, Valentina, Cathy Spatz Widom, and Sally Czaja. 2011. “The role of childhood
neglect and childhood poverty in predicting mental health, academic achievement
and crime in adulthood”. American Journal of Community Psychology 48 (3-4): 309–321.
(Cit. on p. 6).
Nordhaus, William D. 2005. “Irving Fisher and the contribution of improved longevity to
living standards”. American Journal of Economics and sociology 64 (1): 367–392. (Cit. on
p. 7).
— . 2002. The health of nations: the contribution of improved health to living standards. Tech.
rep. National Bureau of Economic Research. (Cit. on p. 7).
Oreopoulos, Philip, Marianne Page, and Ann Huff Stevens. 2008. “The intergenerational
effects of worker displacement”. Journal of Labor Economics 26 (3): 455–483. (Cit. on
p. 6).
Paxson, Christina, and Norbert Schady. 2005. “Child health and economic crisis in Peru”.
The World Bank Economic Review 19 (2): 203–223. (Cit. on p. 5).
Peterson, Cora, Curtis Florence, and Joanne Klevens. 2018. “The economic burden of child
maltreatment in the United States, 2015”. Child Abuse & Neglect 86:178–183. (Cit. on
p. 8).
Sapolsky, Robert M. 2004. “Mothering style and methylation”. Nature Neuroscience 7 (8):
791–792. (Cit. on p. 6).
Schneider, William, Jane Waldfogel, and Jeanne Brooks-Gunn. 2015. “The great recession
and behavior problems in 9-year old children.”Developmental Psychology 51 (11): 1615–
1629. (Cit. on p. 6).
Shah, Anuj K, Sendhil Mullainathan, and Eldar Shafir. 2012. “Some consequences of hav-
ing too little”. Science 338 (6107): 682–685. (Cit. on p. 6).
Siebert,W Stanley, and XiangdongWei. 1994. “Compensatingwage differentials for work-
place accidents: evidence for union and nonunion workers in the UK”. Journal of Risk
and Uncertainty 9 (1): 61–76. (Cit. on p. 7).
38
Stillman, Steven, and Duncan Thomas. 2004. “The effect of economic crises on nutritional
status: evidence from Russia”. IZA Discussion Paper. (Cit. on p. 5).
Viscusi, W Kip, and Joseph E Aldy. 2003. “The value of a statistical life: a critical review of
market estimates throughout the world”. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 27 (1). (Cit. on
p. 7).
Whelan, Karl. 2002. “A guide to using chain-weighted data”. Review of Income and Wealth
48 (2). (Cit. on p. 11).
39
